Seventeen years ago, Israeli political activist Gershon Baskin negotiated with Egypt and a newly in-power Hamas for the return of the captured Gilad Shalit. “I started one week after Shalit was abducted,” said Baskin, who spent five years on the effort, on Wednesday. Eventually, in 2011, Shalit was exchanged for over 1,000 Palestinians and Hamas members held in Israeli prisons — some of whom Israel now says are responsible for the October 7 attack, which led to the current hostage crisis in Gaza.
Nearly three weeks after Hamas’s deadly raid, some 220 Israeli and foreign nationals remain captive in tunnels under a Gaza Strip pummeled by the Israeli Defense Forces’ devastating airstrike campaign. For Baskin, everything this time around is more complicated — higher stakes, untrustworthy negotiators, more proxy nations working to advance their own interests in the talks. Amid the uncertainty, I spoke with Baskin about how the talks are likely happening and possible ways out of the worst hostage crisis in a generation.
What are the latest developments in the hostage crisis following the release of two elderly Israeli women on Monday?
Galatz Radio, the national station operated by the IDF, reported on Wednesday that the Qatari prime minister announced that there is a breakthrough and they are looking toward a significant release of hostages. The national security adviser of Israel, Tzachi Hanegbi, then thanked the Qatari prime minister for helping on the hostage issue:
So maybe we’re on the verge of a breakthrough and an agreement will be announced. I’m skeptical, but we’ll see. If this is going to happen, it’s imminent. It’s very soon.
When you were negotiating over a decade ago, were these bilateral talks with Hamas or were third-party negotiations a part of the process?
I started one week after Shalit was abducted. I was the only one talking directly to Hamas at that point; even the Egyptians weren’t. Hamas was very new at that point. I produced a sign of life two-and-a-half months after Shalid was abducted, proving that he was alive and proving there was a channel for communication. Then immediately the Egyptians stepped in and said they didn’t want anyone else involved.
I spent the next five years trying to advance agreements and make proposals, but it took another five years before I convinced the Israeli government to use my channel as an official channel. It became official in May 2011, authorized by the prime minister. And my work continued until we arrived at what from Mossad officials called the breakthrough document, which was on July 14, 2011. At that point, the negotiations moved back to Egyptian intelligence. But even then I traveled to Cairo, I met with their intelligence, I was in regular contact with the Israeli side and with the Hamas side.
Aside from the obviously complicated nature of the negotiations, why are you skeptical?
The people Qatar is dealing with are mainly the political leadership of Hamas in Qatar, not the political leadership in Gaza. The Hamas leaders in Doha are not in charge of what is on the ground in Gaza. It is more difficult to have a discussion with Hamas leaders in Gaza because they’re mostly underground and avoiding digital communication. It’s not even clear in Gaza who is in charge of all the hostages. Hostages were taken by Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and apparently by individuals as well.
The release of the two elderly Israeli women was done by Egypt directly with Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas. That was very clear that the Egyptians have direct contacts to the military wing. I’m not sure how they communicate; I’m sure it’s complex and slow. But they do have direct contact with people who are holding most of the hostages. But I doubt the Qataris have that connection. So the release of the hostages on Monday was a sign of the competition between Egypt and Qatar.
That is why I think the best channel for communication is Egypt, but if Qataris can make a breakthrough, go for it.
You wrote that Hamas spokesman Ghazi Ahmad negotiated with you over the release of Gilad Shalit. Is he the likely candidate to be negotiating now? He is talking to me; I don’t know how much authority he has. He is a member of the leadership, he is a member of the Shura Council. He does talk to the leadership in Doha and in Gaza. I’m not sure what extent he has any influence with the military, the al-Qassam brigade. He is currently in Beirut. So is Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri, so is Ziad al-Nakhleh, the head of Islamic Jihad. It’s also interesting that the leaders of these resistance movements are not in Gaza when their people are being bombed.
Hostages have been in Gaza for nearly three weeks now. What are some likely ways out of the crisis?
The Thai workers they took, the Nepalese they took, Hamas has been saying that the first secure opportunity they have, we will release them. And it might be real, it might be difficult to release them because they’re in a place within the tunnel network that’s not so easy to get to for release, or it’s being bombed. They have no issue with foreign nationals. But Israelis whose second passports are Israeli — there’s no difference between them and any other Israeli who doesn’t have a second passport.
So the issue now is how Hamas has defined “civilians.” Who are the civilians — and that’s something that needs to be clarified to the Israelis in these negotiations. Who exactly is going to be released? Because the Hamas definition is quite broad of who is a noncombatant, who is not a soldier. Because they know that Israelis go in the army, then they have reserve duty. I think we can assume we’re talking about all the children, all the elderly, many of the women, but not all, because there were young women soldiers who were taken. It’s not clear they’re going to release them. That’s why when I started proposing a deal two weeks ago I spoke specifically about children, women, elderly, and sick. And those are the categories mentioned in the Quran that you don’t kill and you don’t take hostage.
Where is the American leverage in these hostage negotiations?
Let’s face it. Qatar is a strong ally of the United States, the Qataris are buying up companies in America, Silicon Valley, on the NASDAQ, they’re big in the world of sports. They spent billions on the World Cup, they want to be legitimized. Qatar Airways flies all over the world. There’s an American base in Qatar. At the same time, Qatar is a state that supports terrorism. They’re hosting the leadership of Hamas in five-star conditions with protection and bodyguards provided by the Qatari government. The Qataris cannot say they are not a state supporting terrorism. I think Americans have leverage over them, and I think they should use that leverage.
But what does that leverage look like if Qatar is unwilling to expel Hamas leadership?
The U.S. needs to say that if Hamas leaders don’t release hostages, they will be expelled from Qatar. And if Qatar won’t follow through, we will name you as a state that supports terrorism. Now let’s see you do business, let’s see you use SWIFT for money transfers. Let’s see you get permission to fly your airplanes to every airport in the world.
The U.S. is pushing for a delay to a ground invasion. How long can that last?
They can be delayed for as long as they have not exhausted every possibility of freeing hostages without military operations. And that’ll be an assessment that I assume is being made every single day. Then it can be delayed if there’s an agreement for some kind of cease-fire. Of course, a cease-fire could be breached by Israel once it’s determined it’s gotten everyone they can out through negotiations, then they can go ahead. Who is going to hold them to their word that they agree to a cease-fire? It’s not an unending cease-fire forever. They’re still committed to bringing down Hamas and they will do that.
As the conflict drags on, what is a responsible role for the United States?
The U.S. is here to provide deterrence with regard to Lebanon, which is essential. Israel’s deterrence abilities were compromised enormously by the easy breach of the Gaza border. So the American military presence here is existentially important. The continued supply of weapons to Israel is essential to fight this war. But I think that the American role now also has to be to tell the Israelis: “Enough. You bombed the shit out of them. Enough. You killed more than enough people. You’re now committing war crimes.” That’s essentially what’s happening in Gaza. Give the people a break, let the humanitarian aid in, let the people have food and water. Even at the risk that some of it will go to Hamas. I think the American role is to restrain Israel.
Shortly after the October 7 attacks, former IDF general Gal Hirsch was appointed as the national coordinator for hostage and prisoner-of-war affairs. But Hirsch, who resigned in 2006 over the capture of two soldiers, has been widely condemned as not being up to the job. Why was he appointed?
I don’t know the man, I’ve never met him, I’ve had a few WhatsApp communications with him. What’s been reported in the Israeli media by people who know him, and what I’ve been told by former security heads that I’m talking with who know him quite well, all say that he is not the right person for the job at this point. Why was he appointed? People are suggesting it is because of his loyalty to Netanyahu — he is what we call a Bibist. A former security head I’m in contact with told me he spent time with Hirsch last week, who spoke about spending two hours with Sarah Netanyahu, bragging about that. And that’s just remarkable. That someone in this position in this time in this crisis would spend two hours with the prime minister’s wife.
The advice I sent via a third party to the Qataris is that they need to speak to members of the war cabinet — I suggested a few to talk to directly. I suggested to a few of those members of the war cabinet that they initiate communications with Qatar. I don’t know if they’ve done it, but I suspect that the communications have gone above the level of Gal Hirsch.
The worst-case scenarios for the hostages are obvious, but what is a realistic best-case scenario?
The realistic base-case scenario is that the civilians are released and that there is a cease-fire before Israel decides to renew the fight both on the ground and in the air. Then presumably special forces would enter in an attempt to rescue, in which some would succeed and some would probably not succeed. There’s also another scenario, and Israel has apparently dropped leaflets in Gaza saying that anyone who turns over a hostage will be granted amnesty, free passage, and a lot of money. Being that it might not be Hamas that is holding all of the hostages, there may be some people who don’t want to die and could do that as well, we don’t know. Once the Israeli army is advancing then maybe people will desert their post and allow hostages to be freed. There’s no doubt that once a ground operation begins there will be attempts at rescue by special forces and everyone will be at risk.
The only thing I could say with a high degree of assurance is that all the people who are holding hostages will be dead.
